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Abstract 
[Excerpt] In June 1984, Rhode Island voters went to the polls to decide the fate of an ambitious economic 
revitalization plan. Two years in the making, the plan was based on the most comprehensive study of a 
single state's economy ever conducted. It was overseen by a broad-based commission, including AFL-CIO 
leadership, and was authored by a leading authority on industrial redevelopment, Ira Magaziner, who 
infused it with a liberal philosophy. 
Called the Greenhouse Compact, the plan was a tapestry of public policy changes and strategically 
targeted public investment to create jobs in selected industries, and it included concessions from both 
business and labor. It was presented to the electorate a half-year before the actual vote. At 800-plus 
public meetings and in the media, it was heralded as pro-labor, modestly liberal but balanced, 
appropriately priced and financed, and a can't miss, sure thing to resusitate the state's failing economy. 
The program was actively promoted by the governor and most of the state's business, civic, political and 
labor leadership. When the vote came, however, Greenhouse was defeated by a 4-to-l margin. 
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Greenhouse: Why a 
• Dan Weisman 
In June 1984, Rhode Island voters went to the polls to decide the fate 
of an ambitious economic revitalization plan. Two years in the making, 
the plan was based on the most comprehensive study of a single state's 
economy ever conducted. It was overseen by a broad-based commission, 
including AFL-CIO leadership, and was authored by a leading authority 
on industrial redevelopment, Ira Magaziner, who infused it with a 
liberal philosophy. 
Called the Greenhouse Compact, the plan was a tapestry of public 
policy changes and strategically targeted public investment to create 
jobs in selected industries, and it included concessions from both 
business and labor. It was presented to the electorate a half-year before 
the actual vote. At 800-plus public meetings and in the media, it was 
heralded as pro-labor, modestly liberal but balanced, appropriately 
priced and financed, and a can't miss, sure thing to resusitate the state's 
ailing economy. The program was actively promoted by the governor 
and most of the state's business, civic, political and labor leadership. 
When the vote came, however, Greenhouse was defeated by a 4-to-l 
margin. 
The Greenhouse Compact was, on balance, advantageous for working 
people, the poor and minorities. It could have been better for these 
constituencies, but compared to most other economic development 
programs, it was unusually progressive. The Compact sought to create 
60,000 new jobs, at higher than prevalent wages, and this would have 
represented almost full employment in this small state. 
Economic growth would have been pursued without endangering the 
environment, weakening unions, reducing workers' standard of living, 
raiding other states or eroding social services. Instead, particular R.I. 
industries with an inherent but unrealized competitive edge would have 
qualified for free or low cost public investment funds. The plan 
proposed specific policies, governmental services, tax incentives, 
improved infrastructures, workforce retraining and business manage-
ment consulting to improve targeted industries' opportunities for 
stability, growth and new product development. 
Labor's concessions, while greater than industry's, paled in 
comparison with experiences in other planning efforts and in relation 
to the potential benefits of the package. Business agreed to closing some 
unproductive tax loopholes and to some accountability for how 
investment money would be used. Labor agreed to surrender the state's 
little-used but symbolic Strikers' Benefits law, which provided 
unemployment benefits after the eighth week of a strike. Labor also 
allowed a business tax freeze and, in the political process preceding 
the referendum, reductions in workers' compensation benefits. 
One year after Greenhouse was defeated, the Strikers' Benefits law 
was repealed. A year later, the state was subsidizing private industry 
without the performance criteria or social protections contained in the 
Compact. None of the business concessions or labor benefits has yet 
been enacted. 
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Good Plan Failed 
Given the complete package (jobs, higher pay, accountability, and 
scientific rather than random or politicized public subsidies), the plan 
was, overall, good for workers and meritorious of their support. The 
alternative was continued stagnation, low-paying jobs, dead-end careers 
and the exodus of young families. Most voters abandoned their 
economic self interests. Why? 
An analysis of the election data, collected by randomized telephone 
interviews within 24 hours of the referendum, revealed that the plan 
encountered fatal voter mistrust based on the planning process rather 
than the plan. When asked if they felt represented by the commission, 
88% of the no-voters said "no" (compared with 39% of the yes-voters); 
about 90% of all voters indicated that they thought they should have 
been represented. 
The process had begun as representative. The governor, in 1982, 
named a 19-member Strategic Development Commission (SDC), 
including leaders of industry, labor and government. But SDC members 
built their consensus (no small accomplishment for a group representing 
traditionally opposed interests) by isolating themselves from their own 
constituencies and from the general public. The 19 members found 
common objectives and made "reasonable" concessions. They released 
the final report as unamendable economic scripture. The public needed 
only to adopt it. 
As a result, rank-and-file unionists, many business leaders, state 
legislators and working and poor people felt alienated, and rejected 
the Greenhouse Compact. The planners failed to follow the rules of 
coalition work—involve constituents during the concession-trading 
process in order to insure shared understandings and joint ownership. 
Minorities, women, poor and elderly people were not represented 
on the SDC. Nor, it appears, was a significant portion of the business 
community. When a consumer-based group formed and presented its 
concerns to the planners, its modest proposals for more aggressive anti-
bias measures, day care, neighborhood revitalization and representation 
were rejected. The group was rebuffed as a "special interest." Instead 
of supporting a plan that could only help them, consumers were 
disaffected and worked actively for the Greenhouse's defeat. 
In sum, the plan was both feasible and fair, albeit disproportionately 
expensive for labor. It was also justifiably beaten. For labor, the lessons 
are not subtle: organize rather than exclude memberships; reach out 
to unrepresented workers, minorities and others who are a prime target 
for anti-union sentiment; undertake internal economic education so 
members can critically assess economic development programs rather 
than relying on others; and support an open process which involves 
workers and citizens at every stage. • 
• Dan Weisman is Director of Labor Studies at Rhode Island College. This article 
is based on a much more extensive study, "The Rhode Island 'Greenhouse 
Compact': A Labor Perspective on Industrial Policy Development," by Weisman 
and Tracy Fitzpatrick, published in Labor Studies Journal, Spring 1986. 
